On August 28, 2026, the People's Bank of China and the National Financial Regulatory Administration jointly issued the "Opinions on Reforming and Improving Real Estate Credit Management to Accelerate the Construction of a New Real Estate Development Model" (Yin Fa [2026] No. 171). As a researcher who has long tracked China's housing system, I believe this document carries extraordinary weight—it represents a comprehensive upgrade of the real estate credit system that has been in place for over two decades. If the tri-ministerial "Notice" governs "how to sell houses," then the central bank's "Opinions" governs "how to provide funding." Released on the same day, the two complement each other, together forming the twin pillars of the sales system and credit system under the new real estate development model. Below, I outline the key new policies and highlights of these "Opinions" compared to previous regulations across five dimensions.

One: Personal Housing Loans—From "Capped-Outlet Disbursement" to "Completion-Based Disbursement," Finally Achieving "Get the House, Then Repay"

This is the most groundbreaking highlight of the "Opinions." Previously, after buyers signed pre-sale contracts and paid down payments, banks disbursed mortgage loans immediately, requiring borrowers to begin monthly principal and interest payments before the home was even built. The previous "capped-outlet disbursement" requirement—triggering loans once the main structure was topped out—proved premature, given that substantial finishing and landscaping work remained after structural completion. If projects were delayed in delivery, borrowers faced the dilemma of "no house yet, but repayments already due." The "Opinions" fundamentally changes this. Article 22 clearly stipulates: for new homes sold as completed properties, personal housing loans should be disbursed after sales filing; for pre-sold homes, disbursement must strictly occur after project completion filing. This adjustment shifts the disbursement point for pre-sold commercial housing loans from "main structure topped out" to "completion filing." This means buyers transition from "no house, repay anyway" to "get the house, then repay," aligning with international practices. In the United States, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR, personal mortgages are typically disbursed at or near property delivery. This is a milestone institutional reform that fundamentally safeguards homebuyers' legitimate rights.

Two: Loan Tenure—Extended from 30 Years to 40 Years Maximum

Article 20 of the "Opinions" extends the maximum tenure for personal housing loans from 30 to 40 years, a significant adjustment made to meet economic and social development needs. A longer loan tenure means that under equal monthly payment pressure, homebuyers can leverage higher loan amounts; conversely, with equal loan amounts, monthly repayment burdens decrease substantially. This reasonably enhances buyers' borrowing capacity while granting both lenders and borrowers greater flexibility. The specific tenure is determined through consultation between the borrower and commercial bank, fully respecting market participants' autonomous choice.

Three: Real Estate Development Loans—Lead Bank System Implemented, Tenures Significantly Extended

The "Opinions" also introduces unprecedented reforms in development loans. First, it establishes a lead bank system. The document specifies that each real estate project corresponds to one bank as the lead bank (either a single lender or syndication lead), managing project funds under closed-loop supervision. Throughout the project's lifespan, all project-related funds—including development loans, project owner funds, and proceeds from completed property sales—must be held in accounts opened at the lead bank. Previously, developers could borrow from multiple banks or maintain scattered accounts, leading to fragmented fund management; the lead bank system now institutionally ensures dedicated use of funds. Second, development loan tenures are significantly extended. The "Opinions" states that loan tenures should match the project's construction and sales cycle, covering the entire process from groundbreaking to completion filing. Pre-sale project loans can have tenures of up to 5 years; completed property projects, up to 7 years; and commercial real estate projects, up to 7 years—compared to the previous typical 3-year tenure. The first principal repayment date should generally fall after project completion filing, meaning developers face no principal payments during construction, greatly easing funding pressure. Third, the document reiterates a ban on land payment loans, stipulating that "banking financial institutions shall not issue loans for paying land transfer prices and related taxes and fees." This represents an institutional correction of past malpractices where some developers "borrowed to buy land," requiring real estate developers to fund land purchases with their own capital. Combined, these measures effectively "loosen constraints while setting rules" for development loans—loosening tenure limits while instituting closed-loop management.

Four: Credit Product System—From Fragmentation to Full Lifecycle Coverage

Historically, China's real estate credit policies were scattered across numerous documents, lacking systematic coherence. A major contribution of these "Opinions" is the systematic restructuring of real estate credit products. Following the full lifecycle of development, construction, sales, and operations, the document organizes loans into three main categories: First, the development and construction phase, including commercial housing development loans, affordable housing development loans, rental housing development and construction loans, and commercial real estate development loans; second, the sales phase, including personal housing loans, rental housing group purchase loans, and commercial premises purchase loans; third, the operations phase, including operating property loans and rental housing operating loans. The "Opinions" also includes a catch-all provision, allowing the People's Bank of China and the National Financial Regulatory Administration to establish new real estate loan categories as economic and social development needs arise. This "full coverage plus expandable" design reserves ample institutional space for credit demands under the new model.

Five: Institutional Care for Vulnerable Groups—From "Stop Foreclosure Auctions" Advocacy to Central Bank Policy Implementation

Article 26 of the "Opinions" clearly states: "For existing personal housing loan borrowers who experience repayment difficulties due to a temporary loss of income sources, banking financial institutions may, on market-based and rule-of-law principles, consult autonomously with borrowers and flexibly adopt measures such as reasonably extending repayment periods, loan renewals, or deferred principal payments to adjust repayment plans." This provision carries immense weight—it is not a vague policy exhortation but an operational institutional arrangement. As a researcher who has long advocated for "stopping foreclosure auctions," "implementing three suspensions," and "giving struggling families breathing room," I am deeply gratified to see this provision formally enshrined in central bank and financial regulatory documents. I have repeatedly introduced China's past "three suspensions" policy wisdom and suggested applying it to today's personal housing loan predicament. In the late 1990s, the Party and government introduced the "three suspensions"—suspending judicial auctions, suspending interest accrual on loans, and suspending layoffs—as transitional safeguards to help state-owned enterprises navigate systemic crises, laying the groundwork for subsequent economic recovery. This historical lesson teaches us: during market downturns, rather than forcing debtors into default, properties into low-priced auctions, and bank assets into further erosion, it is wiser to give vulnerable groups breathing space—letting time buy space and buffer buy stability. Based on this historical wisdom, I proposed drawing on the "three suspensions" policy through measures such as deferred repayments, suspended interest, internal debt carve-outs, and establishing a national-level purchase platform to rescue defaulting households and stabilize market prices. Specifically, an auction suspension mechanism protects residents' "homes," interest suspension and reduction policies lighten debt burdens, and differentiated credit protection shields family futures. From an economic perspective, auctioned properties—as "special second-hand homes" forcibly disposed of due to debt default and requiring rapid liquidation—differ significantly from ordinary second-hand homes. When a low-priced auctioned property appears in a community, its transaction price quickly becomes the new valuation benchmark for that community's home prices, triggering a vicious cycle: "auction → price drop → more auctions." In this cycle, prices keep falling, auction volumes keep rising, and the market spirals into negative reinforcement. For debtor households, the consequences are severe: not only is property confiscated, but they face joint liability claims and credit collapse. For banks and financial institutions, low-priced auction sales prevent full loan recovery, directly causing loan losses. The total volume of auctioned properties and bank-owned direct supply homes nationwide is actually modest—about 800,000 to 1 million units—yet their impact on the market price system and financial stability far exceeds their scale. Now, Article 26 formally incorporates this concept into the national financial policy framework, transforming my advocacy to "give struggling families breathing room" from a call into policy. First, it provides vulnerable groups a "buffer period." The phrase "temporary loss of income sources" precisely covers those homebuyers who fall into difficulty due to unemployment, illness, or family upheaval—they are not maliciously evading debts but facing temporary hardships. Allowing deferred repayment, loan renewals, or delayed principal gives them a chance to weather the storm. Second, it respects market-based and rule-of-law principles. The "Opinions" emphasizes "consultation with borrowers on market-based and rule-of-law principles," meaning this is not an administrative "one-size-fits-all" decree but rather equal negotiation between banks and borrowers, handled flexibly based on actual circumstances. This protects borrowers' rights while preserving banks' operational autonomy. Third, it reduces auctioned property supply at the source. The proliferation of auctioned homes stems from the chain of loan recovery and judicial auctions following defaults. By allowing banks to negotiate adjusted repayment plans with struggling borrowers, many cases that might otherwise lead to default and auction can be resolved early—borrowers keep their homes, banks avoid bad debts, and the market avoids the impact of low-priced auctioned properties. All three parties benefit. Looking back over recent years, some homebuyers who lost repayment capacity due to income fluctuations or business difficulties were forced into default, their homes auctioned, ending up with "no house, no money," plus heavy debt and credit stains. This situation is a tragedy for individuals, inefficient resource allocation for society, and a downward price spiral for the market. Now, the central bank and financial regulatory authority have provided an institutional solution, giving banks a basis to negotiate with struggling borrowers and enabling struggling families to truly "catch their breath." This is exactly what I have long advocated: making institutions humane, markets resilient, and people hopeful. The issuance of Article 26 marks a transition of my "stop foreclosure auctions" and "three suspensions" advocacy from a researcher's recommendation into national financial policy. I am genuinely pleased and look forward to this system truly taking root, benefiting the countless ordinary families currently in temporary distress.

Six: Abolition of Old Rules—A Thorough Institutional "Gear Shift"

Article 36 of the "Opinions" explicitly abolishes nine old documents, including the 2003 "Notice on Further Strengthening Real Estate Credit Business Management" (Yin Fa [2003] No. 121) and the 2007 "Notice on Strengthening Commercial Real Estate Credit Management" (Yin Fa [2007] No. 359), spanning from 2003 to 2016. Abolishing so many old regulations at once signals that regulators are not "patching" the old system but building an entirely new institutional framework. Reviewing these "Opinions" as a whole, I believe their core value can be summed up in four words—systemic reshaping. This is not tinkering with the old system; it is a comprehensive, well-coordinated, and fully covering real estate credit system rebuilt around the "development-construction-sales-operations" lifecycle. For homebuyers, it resolves the longstanding ailment of "no house, repay anyway," extends loan tenures, and provides debt restructuring space for vulnerable groups; for developers, it addresses "difficult and short-term financing" through the lead bank system and extended tenures; for regulators, it upgrades from "fragmented regulation" to "institutionalized management" via macro-prudential supervision and full-caliber statistics. The core philosophy of the new real estate development model is the dual-track housing system of "market plus safeguard." The realization of this dual-track system hinges on credit system support. The central bank's "Opinions" is precisely the tailored credit infrastructure for the new model. I look forward to these institutions truly taking effect, fostering a virtuous cycle between finance and real estate, and enabling homebuyers, developers, and banks to each gain their due.